Reconsidering Dismantled Nukes, or: Megatons to Megawatts

I just read a fascinating article from the New York Times yesterday on the use of dismantled nuclear weapons as an energy source. Here's the most salient point:

In the last two decades, nuclear disarmament has become an integral part of the electricity industry, little known to most Americans. Salvaged bomb material now generates about 10 percent of electricity in the United States — by comparison, hydropower generates about 6 percent and solar, biomass, wind and geothermal together account for 3 percent. Utilities have been loath to publicize [this fact] for fear of spooking consumers: the fuel from missiles that may have once been aimed at your home may now be lighting it.

It's important to note that this bomb material is coming from both Russian and American weapons that have been dismantled over the course of the past twenty years. Through a series of limitations and reductions treaties -- the most recent of which is the Obama-Medvedev START negotiations -- nuclear weapons have been taken offline; the actual warheads have been separated from the missiles themselves; and then the warheads have been dismantled. However, these treaties don't address the core itself -- the billet of uranium or plutonium that makes a nuclear bomb the terrifyingly powerful weapon it is.

Let's do some math to understand the potential benefits of using dismantled nukes to generate electricity:

The amount of uranium or plutonium that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction, which is needed to create a nuclear bomb, is called the weapon's critical mass. Let's take uranium as an example: the critical mass for uranium-235 is about 56 kilograms, or roughly 123 pounds.

The United States currently has about 2,200 nuclear warheads and the Russians 2,800. Over the summer, Presidents Obama and Medvedev just agreed to reduce their warheads to as low as 1,500 each. So that means that after reductions, the US would give up about 700 nukes and Russia about 1,300. Altogether that's 2,000 nuclear warheads that could now be used to generate electricity. Assuming all 2,000 have uranium cores, and at a minimum of 56 kilograms per warhead, there would be a total of 112 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) available for use in nuclear power plants.

112 tonnes. That's 112,000 kilograms of uranium. According to the New York Times article, 34 tonnes can generate enough electricity to power 1 million American homes for 50 years.

112 divided by 34 equals 3.29. So that means powering 3 million American homes for 50 years.

One more time. 2,000 dismantled nukes can provide enough electricity to power 3 million American homes for 50 years.

Now you can see how beneficial these warheads can be as an energy source. So it's no wonder that for a while now, energy companies have advocated for a steady stream of highly-enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons: they can buy that material at market price, downblend (or de-enrich) the volatile stuff to a level appropriate for use in a civilian nuclear power plant, and generate electricity from it. This program is known as the Megatons to Megawatts program. The energy industry sees huge benefits to acquiring as much uranium as possible for use in nuclear reactors, so naturally, they would advocate for nuclear disarmament. The higher the number of nuclear weapons that come off the grid, the more material available for power generation.

With the energy industry being such an influential lobbying group on Capitol Hill, it would seem advantageous to have Big Energy on the side of those who advocate for global nuclear disarmament. But something like this can never be such a simple win-win solution, so what's the catch? Emissions aren't really a problem, since nuclear power plants don't emit the same level of greenhouse gases that come out of coal-powered plants, which provide the overwhelming majority of electricity in the US.

However, there are serious drawbacks to nuclear power. For a comprehensive list, click through to Time For Change, but here are the relevant ones: first, startup costs. Building a nuclear power plant can take decades, so any return on investment doesn't manifest itself for quite some time.

Second, radioactivity. Who can forget Chernobyl? The possibility that a reactor in the US might melt down and kill or poison scores of people is one of the biggest drivers in keeping total American dependence on nuclear energy to less than 20 per cent.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the radioactive material that is a natural byproduct of the nuclear power cycle can potentially be used to create low-grade nuclear weapons or dirty bombs. This would render the entire Megatons to Megawatts idea completely counter-intuitive -- the point there is to diminish the number of nuclear weapons worldwide, not create more.

So what's the bottom line? On the one hand, those of us advocating for nuclear disarmament now know we have a large ally in Big Energy, and we could leverage our shared goal to pressure government leaders worldwide to take significant and verifiable steps towards complete nuclear weapons abolition. On the other hand, the long-term benefits of relying more on civilian nuclear power don't seem to add up to much, and perhaps we as a nation should continue to keep our dependence on nuclear-generated electricity to less than 20%.

As long as we don't increase the number of nuclear reactors in the US, and as long as we continue to search for a more sustainable and renewable method to generate electricity, continuing the Megatons to Megawatts program seems, in the short term, like an all-around good idea.

Sign the Global Zero Declaration!

I should have done this sooner, but I just became a signatory to Global Zero, an international movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Recently, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution endorsing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons; at the same time, the Nobel Committee awarded President Barack Obama the Nobel Peace Prize, especially citing "his vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons."

We must build an unprecedented global movement to support world leaders who have promised to work towards global zero. To join me and the hundreds of thousands of people in every country in the world who believe in zero, click here.

We must now choose between two very different futures:

1. Nuclear weapons continue to spread, increasing the chances that a country or terrorists use them, with catastrophic consequences. OR
2. All nuclear weapons are eliminated according to a comprehensive global agreement for phased and verified reductions.

Zero is not only desirable, it is also achievable -- with political will. With momentum already building in favor of Zero, a major show of support from people around the world could tip the balance.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, one is one too many. Join today by clicking the link above.

The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons can come to be, but we must get involved to make it happen. So please, sign and ask your friends to do so as well. Make your voice count.

Reconsidering Security Assurances, or: Nuclear Bargaining 101

The thing about using nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip is that the traditional logic doesn't hold up. If we were playing a card game, say poker, then the less one has to lose, the more one might be willing to take risks -- call bluffs, play large pots, etc. The scales are tipped so far in the opposite direction that there is little risk in taking a big gamble, and the payout potential is huge.

With nuclear weapons, however, small, medium and large-size players can all find themselves on equal footing, and can leverage the nuclear threat equally effectively. For example: Russia and the US, with the largest nuclear arsenals, still have a few hundred nukes on hair trigger alert, which makes them large players.

Countries like France and the UK, each of whom dabble in the nuclear sciences in their own ways, are medium players -- the UK still maintains its arsenal of submarine Trident missiles, and France is attempting to take a lead role in the current Iran uranium export deal. India and Pakistan, I feel, also fall into the medium category.

Finally, countries like North Korea, Bangladesh, Burma and even Iran are small players -- no substantial nuclear weapons programs, perhaps a lack of infrastructure, materials, technical expertise and/or funding to enhance capacity. But the one thing that makes the small players just as formidable as the medium and large players is the drive. If a country can acquire, through whatever channels necessary, the means to build even one nuclear weapon, then that small player is just as much a threat as the big player.

In fact, we might even revert to traditional card-playing logic: the small player believes it has more to gain by making larger threats in a louder voice, no matter how substantiated those threats really are. We can witness this right now with Iran and North Korea -- two countries that believe they have more to gain (international recognition, a sense of sovereignty, "respect") than they stand to lose (sanctions sanctions sanctions, threat of military action, being wiped off the map completely).

But remember this: at the end of the day, it doesn't matter how many nuclear weapons a country has. Just one is enough to significantly tip the scales. So if we can come to accept that even a single nuclear warhead has an enormous impact on security relations between countries, then we can take the next step in understanding how we manage these devastating weapons while they still exist.

Here's a recent quote from Foreign Policy in Focus on the Cold War mental approach to nukes:

During the Cold War, we managed our nuclear arsenals rather than reduced them. We treated our nukes like huge, dangerous animals. We restricted their movements but gave them ample care and feeding. Until recently, getting rid of the animals altogether was not part of the political agenda. After all, our leaders believed that these beasts were useful. They scared away the covetous neighbors.

Unfortunately, the mentality still persists, and at all levels. Influential people in large, medium and small-player countries all believe that deterrence is still the name of the game. Whether through a buildup of nuclear stockpiles, or by constructing missile defense shields in strategic regional locations, leaders still somehow believe that the threat of a nuclear weapon must be countered with ... the threat of a nuclear weapon.

Which leads me to my final topic: nuclear umbrellas and security assurances. A few months ago, President Obama committed his administration to reversing the decision made by his predecessor on the installment of missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic. Foreign Policy magazine has provided an excellent analysis of why switching the land-based Bush plan to a more mobile option isn't really an improvement -- it's just a lateral move. Here's the central message:

Even after the United States has set up and activated a national missile-defense system, it still will not have neutralized the perceived threat from Iran. Not only that, but Washington's strategic calculations toward Tehran will remain unaffected: The United States will still need to be just as worried about Iran's missiles, since the destruction of even one U.S. city or region is simply too high a cost to bear. For that security equation to change, national missile defense would need to intercept 100 percent of incoming nuclear warheads -- an unattainable goal for any piece of machinery.

So what this means is that, at the end of the day, using a missile defense shield to deter a possible nuclear attack from a country like Iran yields the same net effect as simply using nuclear weapons themselves for deterrence. Both are flawed approaches that don't actually generate any measurable improvement in global security.

Yet some people just don't seem to get it. Just yesterday, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to providing a nuclear shelter over the East Asia theater. And how, again, does this actually help? Now the ROK is clamoring for the US to actually install tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil. Does anyone really think this will help defuse tensions in the region? If anything, it will make things worse.

There has to be a better solution than countering nukes with nukes or with missile defense shields. The Cold War is over and the bipolarity that dominated that half-century is gone as well. A new line of thinking is needed, and desperately.

Reconsidering North Korea, or: Can't Trust That Wily Kim

Latest news from the Peninsula: North Korea test-launched five short-range missiles on Monday.

For a country that has vacillated on a nearly-weekly basis between conciliation and hostility, what are we to make of this latest development? Here's how Kim has been swinging lately (hostile in bold red, conciliatory in italicized blue):

• Reportedly conducting a nuclear test in April of this year.
• With the efforts of former President Clinton, releasing two American journalists captured along the North-South border.
• Sending a diplomatic envoy to ROK upon the passing of Kim Dae-jung.
• Opening dam gates along the North-South border, releasing a flood into South Korea and killing or injuring hundreds. Later, apologizing for this.
• Agreeing to resume six-party talks.
• Launching missiles -- again.

So what's next? What can we expect? More broadly, how does this impact the global impression of North Korea? That is to say, how seriously can Kim be taken? Seriously. He seems to be dancing an intense samba of provocation -- edging as close to the line as possible, then backing off at the last second. It's like dangling a piece of meat in front of a starved Bengal tiger: eventually, the Bengal will reach a breaking point, snap, and take not only the meat but possibly your arm as well.

And how much is the international community ready to tolerate? I know that many in the political and intelligence establishments are just waiting for old man Kim to die -- but this is naïve thinking, because if the reports are right, and Kim's youngest son Jong-un becomes the next leader of the Stalinist country, then we can't be sure what to expect. And this creates uncertainty, because like the Bengal, the international community can only take so much before it reaches its breaking point.

The difference, however, between a Bengal tiger and the international community is that if we reach that snapping point and exact political, military and/or economic retribution on North Korea, we will be chastened for those harsh actions.

So what's a Bengal to do? One thing's for sure: you can't trust that wily Kim.

Reconsidering Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, or: Oh, Qom On!

Have you been reading about all that's going on with Iran lately? Here's the deal:

1. Three years ago, US, UK and French intelligence started picking up on activity in the mountains of Qom -- tunneling, digging, etc.


2. Although it wasn't publicized until after the G-20 address (see below), Tehran provided the IAEA with a dossier, four days before the UN Security Council meeting on September 24, revealing the location and activities of its second uranium enrichment plant in Qom (the first plant in Natanz is currently being carefully monitored by an Israel with a very itchy trigger finger -- but that's another matter altogether).


3. On September 25, at the opening of the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, along with Prime Minister Brown, jointly addressed the gathering of ministers and government officials, fully revealing all that is known about Iran's Qom operations and condemning Ahmadinejad's actions.


4. Caught with its pants down, and with the encouragement of the international community, Iran has agreed to transfer its low-enriched uranium from Qom to a third country, which will assist in further enriching to 19.75% -- the acceptable level for safe civilian nuclear reactor fuel. Russia and France so far are the leading candidates to provide that third-country assistance.

So what does all this mean? Could all these events really have transpired and been resolved so quickly? US and foreign agencies have been sitting on the Qom intel for three years, and nothing was said until just last week. Can we really believe that with Natanz under IAEA safeguards, Tehran decided to start up just one other facility? Surely, there have to be more scattered around the country. I'm not clear on the inner financial and infrastructural workings of Iran, but I imagine that if a country that ranks 84 on the UN Human Development Index can build a facility by tunneling into a cave in relative secrecy, it can do it again and somewhere else.

Who knows, maybe there's another one right now. Maybe intelligence agencies have been aware of it for a while. Maybe they're still sitting on it because "they are building the case so that they feel that they are in a very strong position when the time comes."

Whatever that means ...

On a Humorous Note ...

Great article from The Onion
---
CHILD WALKS OUT ON TOY NON-PROLIFERATION TALKS
March 23, 2005

BROOKLYN, NY—Toy non-proliferation talks between Donna and Adam Feit and their 8-year-old daughter Corinne broke down Monday when Corinne stormed away from the kitchen and slammed her bedroom door.

"The Feits had hoped to walk away from the dinner-table summit with a cap on the acquisition of new toys and a workable plan for the reduction of those already in their daughter's possession," said Nancy Flemming, the Feits' neighbor and friend. "But after less than half an hour of talks, Corinne said she wished she was never born and stomped to her room. It was nothing short of a meltdown."

The long-standing toy-related conflict between the Feits and their only child came to a head last week when the Feits announced that the rate at which Corinne was amassing toys was unacceptable, and that her new habit of storing toys in the garage and living room was in direct violation of household rules. The Feits suggested the two parties "have a serious talk."

Flemming, who witnessed the summit from a breakfast-nook stool, said the talks began amicably, with all parties enjoying a snack of Oreo cookies and milk.

"The cookies were a show of good will on the part of the Feits," Flemming said. "They generally discourage between-meal snacking, but they wanted to make it clear that they were willing to compromise in order to arrive at a point of agreement satisfactory to both parties."

Indicating that they had no plans to strip Corinne of playtime capabilities, the Feits opened with an offer to allow her to continue to acquire outdoor toys—including balls, bikes, and water guns—provided that she reduce her board games by half.

"Corinne conceded that her board games were in disarray, and agreed to nearly eliminate them if she could double her doll acquisitions," Flemming said. "That's when things turned ugly."

The elder Feits raised concerns that Corinne had accumulated enough dolls to entertain herself 10 times over, and certainly more plush toys than could be safely accounted for. Corinne countered that she did not have nearly as many Bratz dolls as her classmate Jenny Holmes, arguing that she had the right to pursue a relative degree of parity in the toy race.

"The Feits categorically rejected Corinne's proposed increase in doll acquisitions," Flemming said. "Prior to this move, Corinne had demonstrated a willingness to concede certain points to her parents. That changed as soon as the Feits tried to exact a binding commitment from Corinne on the doll point."

Corinne not only questioned her parents' jurisdiction over her, she openly defied it.

"Corinne said she didn't have to do what they said and they should just go ahead and try to make her," Flemming said. "Then she intimated that she could acquire toys through back channels, such as her grandmother. I can only speculate that Corinne was hoping to undermine her parents' authority with that gambit, but it hurt her cause."

Adam responded with the mandate that no new toys were to be brought into the house for three months, at which time the situation would be reviewed to determine whether Corinne had developed a greater sense of responsibility.

"Corinne responded to her father's sanctions by screaming, 'I hate you,'" Flemming said. "I doubt the two parties can hope for a peaceful solution anytime soon. Certainly, a cooling-down period is in order."

Flemming said the Feits were very disappointed that the talks broke down.

"Donna pointed out that toy reduction would serve Corinne's own interests," Flemming said. "She warned that amassing a stockpile of toys without proper containment devices, such as shelves or a toy box, could lead to the needless destruction of toys. And Adam noted that undocumented toy stockpiles could fall into the hands of hostile neighbors, such as the Peterson boy."

Toy-proliferation experts expect the impasse to last at least until morning.

Reconsidering History, or: We're Not Out of the Woods Yet

Unbelievable article from Jonathan Tepperman, writing for Newsweek in late August. Here's point of contention #1:

... all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them ... Nuclear weapons change all that. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button, the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort ... The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows.

Are. You. Kidding. Me. What about all the proxy wars and side skirmishes that have pockmarked the entire half-century since the end of WWII? Tepperman does recognize this, but justifies his rationale by saying that "these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war." I suppose adding up the number of civilian and military casualties in those proxy wars doesn't count for much.

But let's continue reading -- here's point of contention #2:

The record shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008).

Now since the author's brought it up, let me address this very clearly: no one can call the 2001 and 2008 attacks "provocations." Those were flat-out attacks. And while I am not determining who carried out those attacks (simply because there is no conclusive proof), one thing is for sure: an armed attack on a major city that yields loss of life and limb is much more than a provocation. To provoke someone is to insult them, question their intelligence, make derogatory remarks regarding their mother, and so on. 2001 and 2008 were not provocations. They were tragedies, disasters and by some accounts acts of war. Provocation, indeed. That's like calling 9/11 a "mishap."

Moreover, using India/Pakistan as a model to justify Tepperman's thinking is gravely short-sighted. There are many more issues between these two nations that need to be resolved. India and Pakistan's inherent mutual mistrust and occasional hatred is nothing like the Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR, which was based on large-scale geopolitics and was driven by who would have the ultimate bragging rights and the last laugh. Distilling India and Pakistan's "rivalry" to make it seem anything remotely resembling the US/USSR rivalry is dangerous thinking.

Point of contention #3:

... are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died ... the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism -- but so did Moscow and Beijing. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen.

Back up one second. You're telling me that a comparison between today's Kim/Ahmadinejad and yesteryear's Stalin/Mao is historically accurate? Mr Tepperman, are you taking into account all the historical, social, economic and cultural nuances that are absolutely IMPERATIVE if you are going to attempt such comparison? Again, oversimplification. Extremely dangerous and highly inaccurate.

Unfortunately, the rest of the article is filled with equally misleading ideas, poorly formed thoughts and conclusions based on dubious facts. At the end of the day, writing like this makes me extremely nervous, because Tepperman thinks he's doing the public a favor by distilling what must be extremely hard-to-grasp concepts into simplified logic and kindergarten logic. In reality, however, he's creating a set of misled and misleading arguments that certainly would make for a foolproof case for the uninformed, unaware masses. There is so much more to this debate!

Finally, Tepperman fails to address something I've discussed in the past: a world without nuclear weapons won't prevent conflict from taking place. It's still going to happen. Nukes don't really deter anything.

In the end, David Krieger at the New Age Peace Foundation says it best when he responds to Tepperman's conclusion with a very basic and humanistic bottom-line message:

“Nuclear peace,” [Tepperman] tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species.

We simply cannot let that happen.

Reconsidering 9/11, or: Progress Yet?

Eight years later, US forces are still engaged in two wars overseas, and though President Obama has pledged to bring our troops home, he is currently seeking to augment our presence in Afghanistan with a contingency of troops that would bring our total commitment on the ground to over 80,000. Eight years later, although other top al-Qaida leaders have been allegedly captured or killed, Osama bin Laden still hasn't been found. Eight years later, the tarnished image of the United States abroad has not been rectified, despite having a new President who has taken great pains to bridge the gap between the Islamic world and the US.

On the home front, our nation is no more secure now than it was in 2001, despite having a Department of Homeland Security dedicated to mitigating and eliminating any threats within our national borders. Muslims in the US and abroad (including this writer) are still stereotyped as harboring fanatical religious ideals and encouraging violence within their communities.

So what have we learned from 9/11?

One thing I have learned is that while we as a nation could have allowed that horrifying day to fundamentally alter our worldview, we have instead found comfort in solidarity. And although the manifestation of that solidarity has not always been positive or nurturing (anti-Muslim sentiment at home, collective support against an unseen "enemy" somewhere in Iraq and Afghanistan justifying our military engagement there), I myself have learned just as much from my compatriots here at home. As an American Muslim born and raised in the US, I have had less difficulty in "proving my Americanism" than my equally patriotic American Muslim friends who were born abroad and came to the States at a very young age. Yet all of us have stories to share and perspectives from which we can learn. I have faced discrimination from both non-Muslim Americans and non-American Muslims -- the former for not being American enough, the latter for not being Muslim enough. Yet the only divide between Muslim and being American is an imaginary divide of perception, not an actual divide of ideology or dogma. For being Muslim and being American are not antithetic -- rather, they are very symbiotic. But it has taken me much reflection to realize that. It's important now that we learn from each other, rather than typecast.

Another thing I have learned is that despite the best intentions and efforts of our leaders and government, the United States will ultimately be no safer today or tomorrow than it was eight years ago. The reason is simple and can be found in that inherent American worldview: no one can truly be denied the right to come to the US and make a new life. America is the land of opportunity, and at the risk of sounding cheesy, I will quote the State of Liberty:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

Ultimately, we all are immigrants, and we have witnessed just as much homegrown violence and extremism as we have experienced from sources abroad. There is no way to completely and effectively guarantee the security of our soil. The best we can do is train to be as prepared as possible to respond to any emergency or disaster.

Finally -- and this point is to bring today's post back into the fold of the blog's overall theme -- I have learned that the possession of a tremendously powerful nuclear arsenal by the United States did not prevent six men with boxcutters from hijacking two planes and shattering our world. Had our stockpile been twice as large as it was, it would not have changed a thing. By the same token, an arsenal half the size of what it was would have made no difference either.

In the past eight years, those with the foresight (and hindsight) to understand how we can create a safer and more stable future have been advocating loudly not simply for non-proliferation measures, but for complete and total global disarmament. Nuclear deterrence, they argue, is no longer acceptable; Cold War tactics can no longer apply in a non-zero-sum global arena; and identifying the enemy against which nuclear weapons would be most effective is next to impossible in an environment of asymmetric warfare. Thus, nuclear terrorism has become an extremely salient and urgent matter on which government leaders worldwide must collaborate, in order to prevent even a single nuclear weapon from falling into the hands of a rogue nation, splinter group or non-aligned party.

To draw an analogy -- the most safe form of sex is abstinence. Likewise, the best guarantee against nuclear terrorism is to not have the nuclear weapons at all in the first place. No one in the Obama administration has ever advocated for unilateral disarmament. This would be a diplomatically and militarily risky move, not to mention politically foolish. Mutual reductions, however, based on a timeline that culminates in Global Zero, is not only morally right, it is logistically and politically possible.

So perhaps today, on the eighth anniversary of 9/11, the real lesson we can take away from that horrendous experience is this: If we ever want to make significant strides towards protecting our world and guaranteeing the security of humankind, we must take action now to get rid of nuclear weapons worldwide.

Reconsidering Western Academic Fascinations, or: China's Rising Star

To deviate a little from this blog's very palpable theme, today's post is not nuclear weapons-related:

A recent New York Times article discusses an increasing trend among younger Americans to move to China for career opportunities:

Shanghai and Beijing are becoming new lands of opportunity for recent American college graduates who face unemployment nearing double digits at home. Even those with limited or no knowledge of Chinese are heeding the call. They are lured by China’s surging economy, the lower cost of living and a chance to bypass some of the dues-paying that is common to first jobs in the
United States.

The fascinating part about all this is not that recent university graduates and young professionals are becoming interested in a country halfway round the world; no, the exciting bit is that the region of interest is shifting. That is, the Islamic world had its opportunity. Now it's time to pass the torch onto China.

Prior to 9/11, most American students' fascination was, I feel, largely with one of two regions: either northern and central Asia (as Russia and the former Soviet states attempted to regain their foothold) or the European subcontinent (as the EU moved from conception into its early stages of formation and cohesion). After September 11, however, many Americans sat up and took notice of the heretofore largely ignored swath of land that stretches from Morocco in the West to Iran in the East. As reported in 2004 by Campus Watch, the demand on US university campuses for Arabic language courses skyrocketed:

Three years after terrorists struck the United States, enrollment in Arab-language courses across the nation is booming and colleges are working to meet growing student interest in Middle Eastern studies and government demand for Arabic speakers. Arabic is now the fastest-growing foreign language on the nation's college campuses ... Statistics gathered by the Modern Language Association showed enrollment in Arabic classes had nearly doubled to 10,596 students between 1998 and 2002.

How interesting that now, as China's economic star is on the rise (and no doubt bolstered by the 2008 Olympics), student enrollment in Chinese language classes is taking off in much the same way it did with Arabic just a few years ago.

What, then, does this shifting trend indicate in terms of US foreign relations? Witness the tremendous focus by the American government on the Middle East over the past 8 years, including two military campaigns in the region. Witness also the strategic alliances formed amongst government, private sector and academic institutions, all conceived in order to foster open dialogue, better understanding and shared mutual interests. Witness, finally, the rise of luxury haven Dubai in the heart of the region.

So -- as resources are exploited; as systems of government are challenged and sometimes replaced; and as foreign investment pours into a hitherto largely neglected region -- how do these changes affect foreign affairs? More importantly, when will the tide turn again?

For now we watch the rise of one of the world's largest countries (in terms of landmass and population) and one of the five recognized nuclear weapons powers. With tons of foreign investment coming in and interest in its language / culture / business ethics steadily on the rise, China is preparing to take the world stage as a true player in global economics and politics. The full scope and depth of China's importance on the world stage has yet to be realized -- though the Chinese government certainly has been flexing its muscle for quite some time now as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. But one thing remains certain: China will play an increasingly important role in global affairs, at both an economic and a military level.

Thinking ahead: when would a shift of focus away from China occur? 10 years from now? Longer? And if and when that shift does take place, what region will become the next great power player? (The Economist last week suggested that from a business perspective, Brazil might just be that place.)

Southern Hemisphere Clean, or: Geographically Halfway to Success!

Wonderful news coming to us from the Global Security Newswire:

The African Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty's entry into force last month [July 2009] established a ban on nuclear weapons throughout the entire southern hemisphere, the International Atomic Energy Agency said Friday.

This truly is fantastic news. That all countries south of the Equator have committed to a nuclear weapons-free world is absolutely significant. Of course, the southern hemisphere is also largely devoid of the same technological development as the North -- plus the majority of the world's population lives above the Equator:


(On a side note, if you take a page out of Jared Diamond's brilliant book Guns, Germs and Steel, you'd recognize why the North is so developed vs the South. But I digress.)

So all that is to say that perhaps having the entire Southern hemisphere commit to being a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) is not that big a deal, since the real power players live in the North. This very well might be a valid point. But consider the increasingly globalized world in which we live. Consider how much current events are affecting all countries and all peoples, regardless of socioeconomic factors like population density or income distribution. There is no doubt in my mind that this momentous occasion, when half of our geographic Earth is committed to a nuclear weapons-free world, will have a profound and long-lasting impact on key decision makers in all developed countries.

The goal of seeking a world devoid of these instruments of mass slaughter is no longer the goal of just President Obama -- it has been embraced by other world leaders, both on and off the political stage. Events have been set in motion and the movement is gaining momentum, slowly but surely. As efforts are consolidated by the medical community (IPPNW), grassroots organizations (We Must Disarm), academic intelligentsia (Harvard Kennedy School) and think tanks (Council on Foreign Relations), among others, policymakers around the world are starting to take notice.

So are people like you and me.

It's time to turn the tides; it's time to stop believing nuclear weapons will protect anyone from anything; it's time to come to full terms with the true capabilities of these instruments and accept that we as a race are better off without them (see my post on specicide).

It all starts here. It all starts now.